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ADVANCING REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE IN LATIN
AMERICA THROUGH A TRANSITIONAL
JUSTICE LENS
Rosario Grimà Algora*
ABSTRACT
Reproductive autonomy is a pivotal part of women’s access to
equal citizenship, yet it has not been included in any international
nor regional human rights treaty. In the past decades, the U.N.
Committees, notably the CEDAW Committee, and regional human rights bodies, particularly the Inter-American System for the
Protection of Human Rights, have timidly advanced reproductive
justice through their jurisprudence, including through the use of
reparations. Drawing from the standards of reparations developed
in the field of transitional justice, human rights bodies increasingly
rely on reparations to enhance the transformative effects of their
decisions. These reparations intend to include a gender-perspective
in their design and aim to ensure the non-repetition of human
rights violation, not only to the victim, but to society. Constitutional courts in Latin America are increasingly relying on the
standards of reparations in their own decisions, including in those
on reproductive justice. In this Article, I analyze two recent rulings
from Latin American constitutional courts–one from Colombia
and one from Ecuador–to understand how courts can use reparations to advance reproductive justice. I analyze these particular
rulings for two reasons: (1) Both rulings have the potential to develop reproductive jurisprudence in the region where high courts
have traditionally imported international and comparative law to
resolve legal debates over reproductive rights; and (2) Both rulings
challenge the traditional concept of reparations and offer an opportunity to rethink how the remedy can be deployed in a human
rights context.

* I would like to thank Ruth Rubio-Marín for her encouragement and inspiration in
writing this article, and Graeme Simpson for his support and guidance.
155

156

m i c h i ga n j o urn a l of ge n d e r

& la w

[Vol. 28:155

TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABSTRACT s 155
I. INTRODUCTION s 156
II. REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: TOWARDS AN EQUAL
CITIZENSHIP s 162
III. REPARATIONS IN THE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE
FIELD s 166
IV. REPARATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS BODIES s 169
A. International Human Rights Bodies s 170
B. Inter-American System for the Protection of Human
Rights s 175
V. REPARATIONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS s 180
A. Overview of the Region s 180
B. Ecuador s 183
1. Facts s 183
2. Decision s 184
3. Reparations s 185
4. Significance of the Case s 186
C. Colombia s 187
1. Facts s 190
2. Decision s 191
3. Reparations s 192
4. Significance of This Case s 192
VI. CONCLUSION s 193
I. Introduction
Women’s right to participate in the political, social, economic, and
cultural life in equal conditions to men is enshrined in the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(CEDAW).1 Reproductive rights 2 are a pivotal part of women’s citizen1. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13.
2. By reproductive rights I mean the basic rights of all persons to reproductive selfdetermination. This includes freedom to decide on the number, spacing and timing of
their children, access to the information and means to do so, and the right to attain the
highest standard of sexual and reproductive health. Reproductive rights also include
the right to make these decisions free of discrimination, coercion, and violence.
UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND, THE DANISH INST. FOR HUMAN RTS. &
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
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ship, but they were not included in the text of the CEDAW nor in other international human rights treaties: reproductive rights are not mentioned in the plain text of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic,
Cultural and Social Rights (ICESCR), the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) nor in the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT). 3 Yet these rights have, scarcely and slowly, been developing in international law. The U.N. Committee on the Elimination
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee), as well as
other U.N. Committees responsible for monitoring the implementation
of the above-mentioned treaties,4 have been advancing these rights
through their concluding observations, general comments, and commu-

HUMAN RIGHTS: A HANDBOOK FOR NATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTIONS
19 (2014), https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/NHRIHandbook.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3VJ2-KQRK]. Reproductive rights can be distinguished from reproductive autonomy, which is the capacity of individuals to freely decide their own
reproductive matters, and reproductive justice, which is a health and advocacy framework started in the United States to address the shortcomings of the pro-choice
movement. Id.at 26; see also Part II below (explaining the reproductive justice framework).
3. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966,
993 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 113.
4. The U.N. Human Rights Committee, the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, and the Committee against Torture have interpreted the meaning of
the rights in their treaties to include reproductive rights. See, e.g., Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights., General Comment No. 22: Article 12 on the Right to
Sexual and Reproductive Health, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/22 (May 2, 2016) (stating
that the right to health includes sexual and reproductive health); L.M.R. v. Argentina,
Hum. Rts. Comm., Comm. No. 1608/2007, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007,
¶¶ 9-11 (Apr. 28, 2011), https://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/Decision.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E63Q-F4AM] (concluding that the denial of access to an abortion
caused L.M.R. “physical and mental suffering” that amounts to a violation of Article 7
of the ICCP which prohibits torture, or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment);
Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture:
Nicaragua, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/NIC/CO/1, ¶ 16 (June 10, 2009), https://
www.refworld.org/publisher,CAT,,NIC,4a85632bd,0.html (urging Nicaragua to review its legislation on abortion); Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic
Report of Honduras, Committee against Torture, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/HND/CO/2
¶¶ 47-48 (Aug. 26, 2016) (stating its concern with the restrictions on access to abortion in Honduras, and recommending the state to ensure that women who decide to
terminate their pregnancy have access to safe, legal abortions), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org
/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2fC%2fHND%
2fCO%2f2&Lang=en.
ARE
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nications.5 Regional human rights bodies have also timidly addressed
reproductive rights, with the Inter-American System for the Protection
of Human Rights leading this trend. 6 Despite these slight developments,
women’s reproductive autonomy and self-determination is constantly
violated by state and non-state actors. Attacks on this include restrictive
abortion legislation, 7 state-sponsored forced sterilization,8 criminaliza-

5. See Part IV below.
6. Id. The Inter-American System of Human Rights is composed of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights (IACtHR). These entities were established in the American Convention on
Human Rights (Pact of San Jose). Id. Article 41 establishes that the Commission is
responsible for promoting “respect for and defense of human rights.” Organization of
American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 41, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. The Commission also serves quasi-judicial
functions. What is the I/A Court H.R.?, INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS, https://www.corteidh.or.cr/que_es_la_corte.cfm?lang=en (last visited Nov.
12, 2021) [https://perma.cc/R9Z9-464S]. Individuals, groups, and nongovernmental
entities must first lodge their petition alleging a violation of human rights to the
Commission. See American Convention on Human Rights art. 44, Nov. 22, 1969,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. The Commission assists parties in reaching
a friendly settlement or, if this is not reached, it develops a report containing the facts
and its conclusions, and transmits the report to the states concerned. Id. at arts. 4850. If the Commission considers it pertinent, it can submit a case before the IACtHR
– only the Commission and States can submit a case to the Court directly, the rest of
actors must first send the petition to the Commission. Id. at art. 61. If the matter has
not been settled or submitted to IACtHR, and its jurisdiction accepted, the Commission may provide its opinions and conclusions on the question, if an absolute majority of its members vote to do so. Id. at art. 51.
7. See International Human Rights Law and Abortion in Latin America, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (July 2005), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounder/wrd/wrd0106
/wrd0106.pdf [https://perma.cc/BU3Q-TY8V] (providing an overview of the status
of abortion legislation in Latin America); Latin America’s Draconian Abortion Laws
and Policies Punish Millions of Women and Girls, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (May 28,
2015, 2:14 PM), https://www.amnesty.org/es/latest/news/2015/05/latin-americasdraconian-abortion-laws-and-policies-punish-millions-of-women-and-girls/ [https://
perma.cc/K562-3ZUQ] (denouncing the effects that the draconian abortion legislation
in the region have on women and girls).
8. See, e.g., Chávez v. Peru, Case 12.191, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 71/03,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 70 rev. 2 (2003), https://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep
/2003eng/peru.12191.htm [https://perma.cc/9SAD-7EFN].
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tion of abortions, miscarriages, and stillbirths, 9 obstetric violence,10 and
forced abortions and use of contraceptives.11
In the United States, women of color addressed the importance of
ensuring reproductive autonomy to all women in the 1990s by conceptualizing the reproductive justice framework.12 This framework expanded on the pro-choice movement’s focus on negative rights—such as ensuring access to abortion and contraceptives—and calls for the
importance of including access to positive rights—including socioeconomic rights—in the quest for reproductive justice. This framework
is therefore based on three primary values: the right to have a child, the
right not to have a child, and the right to parent in a safe and healthy
environment. 13 It also relies on an intersectional approach to highlight
how the intersection of gender with race, sexual orientation and gender
identity, socio-economic status, migration status and other dimensions
of inequality all shape the experiences of women and heighten the inequalities of reproductive decision making. 14
In this Article, I examine how reproductive justice can be achieved
in Latin America. I propose that transitional justice mechanisms can be
a tool to advance reproductive justice, not only in countries transitioning from an armed conflict or authoritarian regime, but also in consolidated democracies. 15 Transitional justice is “the full range of processes
and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms
with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability,

9. See, e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights files case of Manuela vs. El Salvador before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE
RTS., (Oct. 10, 2019), https://reproductiverights.org/press-room/inter-americancommission-human-rights-filed-case-manuela-vs-el-salvador-inter-american [https://
perma.cc/5ZRG-K2S7] [hereinafter Press Release].
10. See Part V below.
11. See Part V below (explaining the Colombian case of Helena, a former member of the
FARC who was forced to use a contraceptive and have an abortion).
12. LORETTA ROSS & RICKIE SOLINGER, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION 2
(2017) (using a human rights analysis to introduce and frame a discussion of reproductive justice in the twenty-first century).
13. Id. at 9.
14. Id. at 65, 72.
15. Consolidated democracies is a term used in the transitional justice field to categorize
countries that are not transitioning from an armed conflict or authoritarian regime.
The term was first defined by Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan as “a political regime in
which democracy as a complex system of institutions, rules, and patterned incentives
and disincentives has become, in a phrase, ‘the only game in town.’” Juan J. Linz &
Alfred Stepan, Toward Consolidated Democracies, 7 J. DEMOCRACY 14, 15 (1996).
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serve justice and achieve reconciliation.”16 Transitional justice, with
mechanisms such as reparations, truth commissions, institutional reform, accountability and reconciliation, initially served as a path for
countries transitioning to a democracy from an armed conflict or authoritarian regime, as a form of addressing past mass atrocities and systematic abuse, and ensuring accountability and redressing victims.
Truth commissions, for example, are used to clarify and seek the truth
of passed atrocities that took place in an armed conflict or period of repression. 17 However, transitional justice mechanisms are today used to
contribute to a range of goals that are not limited to the transition to
democracy. 18 One of these increasing developments is precisely their
application in consolidated democracies to address situations of systematic violence and discrimination, or past unjust practices.19 This is for
example the case with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of
Canada, which introduced the broader Canadian public to the “cultural
genocide” committed against Aboriginal communities through Indian
Residential Schools. 20
16. U.N. Secretary-General, Guidance Note of the Secretary-General: United Nations Approach to Transitional Justice 1, 3 (Mar. 2010), https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ
_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6BK-VFN5].
17. Perhaps the most well-known example of a truth commission is the South African
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was established after apartheid to understand what happened, confront the reality of the violence and human rights violations that occurred and take steps to prevent similar atrocities in the future. For more
information on South Africa’s truth commission, see ALEX BORAINE, A COUNTRY
UNMASKED: INSIDE SOUTH AFRICA’S TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
(2001) (providing a detailed account of the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, its hearings, and criticisms of the final report).
18. See generally Thomas Obel Hansen, The Time and Space of Transitional Justice, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 34, 35 (Cheryl Lawther, Dov Jacobs & Luke Moffett eds., 2017).
19. Id. For details revealed by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada of
human rights abuses committed against Canadian indigenous children in “Indian Residential Schools,” see GOVERNMENT OF CANADA, Truth and Reconciliation Commission
of Canada, https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1450124405592/1529106060525
[https://perma.cc/GHE8-XNAS] (last updated June 11, 2021).
20. The establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was part of the Indian Residential Schools Settlement. Indian Residential Schools separated over 150,000
Aboriginal children from their homes, families, traditions and cultures, and force them
to assimilate into the dominant culture. See STEPHEN HARPER, GOVERNMENT OF
CANADA, Statement of Apology to Former Students of Indian Residential Schools, (June
11, 2008), https://www.rcaanc-cirnac.gc.ca/eng/1100100015644/1571589171655
[https://perma.cc/5XRK-CQ6A]; see also TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
OF CANADA, HONOURING THE TRUTH, RECONCILING FOR THE FUTURE: SUMMARY
OF THE FINAL REPORT OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF
CANADA 3-4 (2015), https://ehprnh2mwo3.exactdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2021
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All transitional justice mechanisms could be used to advance women’s citizenship.21 While acknowledging this, I focus on reparations because they are the most victim-centered mechanism and they have already been used to advance reproductive justice at the international,
regional, and national level.22 I specifically focus on the potential value
of judicial reparations, which are those issued by courts for a specific
case, and are designed on a case-by-case basis and decided in strict proportion to the harm caused—as opposed to large-scale administrative
reparation programs that target a wide pool of victims.
In Part II, I present the reproductive justice framework and the advantages of using it to analyze violations of women’s reproductive autonomy and self-determination. In Part III, I examine the development
of the right to reparations in the transitional justice field. In Part IV, I
explore how the different modalities of reparations derived from the
transitional justice field have been used by international and regional
human rights bodies to address reproductive violations. In Part V, I analyze two recent cases on reproductive justice—one from the Ecuadorian
Constitutional Court and another from the Colombian Constitutional
Court to explore their potential impact on reparations and the wider
understanding of reproductive justice in the region. They represent a
case from a consolidated democracy (Ecuador) and another from a
country in transition (Colombia), to illustrate how the continuum of
violence against women23—in these cases, violations to women’s reproductive autonomy—transcends the current categories of war and peace.
I conclude by noting that the standards of reparations developed in
transitional justice context are influencing ordinary justice procedures.24

21.
22.

23.

24.

/01/Executive_Summary_English_Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF67-63U9] (summarizing the work of Canada’s truth and Reconciliation Commission).
See, e.g., Daniel Aguirre & Irene Pietropaoli, Gender Equality, Development and Transitional Justice: The Case of Nepal, 2 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 356 (2008) (examining the links between development, transitional justice and gender equality).
See Section IV “Reparations in International and Regional Human Rights Bodies”,
below (analyzing how the CEDAW and CCPR, and the Interamerican System for
the Protection of Human Rights have been using reparations to advance reproductive
justice).
The continuum of violence is a concept used by activists and scholars to understand
the links between various forms of violence against women, ranging from sexual harassment to rape and murder, in order to understand that these are not isolated behaviors or experiences. See, e.g., LIZ KELLY, SURVIVING SEXUAL VIOLENCE 75-77 (1988)
(linking this continuum to structural inequalities, aggression, and patriarchal norms
that influence a range of male behavior).
Ordinary justice procedures are those that apply in times of peace and general circumstances, as opposed to those procedures that have been designed to apply to a
specific context. For example, the Colombian Special Jurisdiction of Peace has been
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Human rights bodies and national courts already started to move beyond reparations that only restore the victim to the original situation before the violation, and are instead awarding reparations that address the
root causes of structural violence. This creates an opportunity for litigators to request more transformative reparations before national constitutional courts. The highest courts of Latin America rely on international
and transnational law for reasoning and political legitimacy in their decisions, including those concerning reproductive justice. Thus, these
cases have the potential to advance reproductive justice and the use of
reparations in the region.
II. REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: TOWARDS AN EQUAL CITIZENSHIP
The core idea of the reproductive justice framework is that reproductive autonomy is key to women’s citizenship.25 Only if women’s reproductive autonomy and self-determination is respected and protected
can they have full control over their own bodies, determine their life’s
course, and access all the benefits promised to citizens, whether economic, political, or social. Created in the 1990s by women of color in the
United States, the reproductive justice framework challenged the limited
scope of the pro-choice movement—led mostly by white women—
which sought to ensure women’s access to abortion and contraceptives
without the interference of the state.26
The United States Supreme Court framed both rights to access to
abortion and contraceptives—as part of the individual right to privacy—as negative rights. 27 Thus, states do not have positive obligations to
ensure that women have access to these rights; they just need to refrain
from interfering with women’s path to terminate their pregnancy or access contraceptives.28 Yet the uneven distribution of economic resources

25.
26.
27.
28.

designed to have the exclusive jurisdiction over the crimes and violations that were
committed during the Colombian armed conflict, whereas all other matters are addressed through the court system established in the Constitution, with the Supreme
Court of Justice being the highest court. Jurisdicción Especial Para la Paz,
JURISDICCIÓN ESPECIAL PARA LA PAZ, https://www.jep.gov.co/JEP/Paginas/JurisdiccionEspecial-para-la-Paz.aspx [https://perma.cc/DD7E-KRBW] (last visited August 26,
2021, 9:12 pm).
See, e.g., Barbara Stark, Reproductive Rights and the Reproduction of Gender, GENDER
EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN’S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 345 (Linda C. McClain
& Joanna L. Grossman eds., 2009).
ROSS & SOLINGER, supra note 12, at 55.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 80-81; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (upholding the
Hyde Amendment and finding that an individual’s right to access an abortion does
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means that women of color do not have the same choices as many white
women. 29 Women of color developed the reproductive justice framework to call for a wider understanding of the context, structures, and
conditions that shape access to reproductive autonomy. 30
The reproductive justice framework is anchored on human rights
law, consolidating the notion that reproductive matters “are not just favors or luxuries, but [] are rights,” that women are entitled to demand
the state to respect, protect, and fulfill. 31 It further advocates for the
analysis of these matters through an intersectional approach. An intersectional approach specifically examines the gender, racial, social, political, and economic systems and inequalities that impact women’s reproductive health and their ability to control their reproductive lives. 32
This framework has three primary values: the right to have a child,
the right not to have a child, and the right to parent in a safe and
healthy environment.33 By expanding the debate over “choice” to one of
safe and dignified access to childbirth, parenting and fertility management, reproductive justice quickly began to replace the language of the
movement in the United States and internationally. 34
Various human rights bodies have also taken a broader approach to
recognizing when sexual and reproductive violence is rights violative.
The CEDAW Committee has recognized that violations of sexual and
reproductive health and rights are forms of violence against women and
therefore a form of discrimination. 35 These violations include, “forced

29.
30.
31.

32.

33.
34.
35.

not entitle them to financial resources to access this service, and holding that a lack of
resources is not an obstacle created by the state, whose only obligation is to “not place
obstacles in the path of a woman’s exercise . . . it need not remove those not of its
own creation. Indigency falls in the latter category”).
ROSS & SOLINGER, supra note 12, at 79-81.
Id.
See Alejandra Cardenas, Director of Global Legal Strategies of the Center for Reproductive Rights, United Nations Population Fund, What’s Next? ICPRD Through the Lens of
Reproductive Justice, YOUTUBE (Oct. 14, 2020), https://youtu.be/qEma4fPUeFA
[https://perma.cc/WH4V-RD89] for a discussion of how human rights have been instrumental to pursuing a reproductive rights agenda.
See generally Melissa Murray, Race-ing Roe: Reproductive Justice, Racial Justice, and the
Battle for Roe v. Wade, 134 HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2053-54 (2021) (discussing the historic intersection of gender, race and reproduction through an intersectional analysis).
ROSS & SOLINGER, supra note 12, at 65.
See UNFPA Handbook, supra note 2; see also ROSS & SOLINGER, supra note 12, at
65-71 (detailing the expanded use of “reproductive justice” after it was created in
1994).
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation No. 35 on Gender-Based Violence Against Women, Updating General Recommendation No. 19, at 6, CEDAW/C/GC/35 (July14, 2017), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org
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sterilizations, forced abortion, forced pregnancy, criminalization of
abortion, denial or delay of safe abortion and post-abortion care, forced
continuation of pregnancy, abuse and mistreatment of women and girls
seeking sexual and reproductive health information, goods and services,”36 as well as obstetric violence.37 The U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has clarified that sexual and reproductive health is an integral part of the right to health enshrined in
Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 38 The U.N. Committee Against Torture and the U.N.
Human Rights Committee have also determined that under certain circumstances, reproductive violations amount to torture, inhumane, or
degrading treatment.39
Violations of reproductive autonomy need to be placed within the
continuum of violence against women and girls that they experience
throughout their lifetime. 40 Recognition of this continuum promotes
the understanding that acts of violence against women and girls are not

36.
37.

38.
39.

40.

/Treaties/CEDAW/Shared%20Documents/1_Global/CEDAW_C_GC_35_8267_E.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7BZL-QJAQ].
Id.
The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women defines obstetric violence
as “violence experienced by women during facility-based childbirth” and constitutes a
“fundamental obstacle for ensuring women’s reproductive autonomy before, during,
and after childbirth.” This includes unnecessary Cesarean sections or other procedures, as well as performing procedures without the informed consent of the patient.
Dubravka Šimonović (Special Rapporteur), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women, its Causes and Consequences, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/74/137 (July
11, 2019) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur Report].
Comm. on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights., General Comment No. 22:Article
12 on the Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/22
(May 2, 2016).
See, e.g., Hum. Rts. Comm., Commc’n No. 1608/2007, L.M.R. v. Argentina, ¶¶ 9-11
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007(Apr. 28, 2011), https://www.escr-net.org
/sites/default/files/Decision.pdf [https://perma.cc/E63Q-F4AM]; Comm. Against
Torture, Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture: Nicaragua, ¶ 16,
U.N. Doc. CAT/C/NIC/CO/1(June 10, 2009), https://www.refworld.org/publisher,
CAT,,NIC,4a85632bd,0.html (urging Nicaragua to review its legislation on abortion) ; Comm. Against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Second Periodic Report of Honduras, ¶¶ 47-48, , U.N. Doc. CAT/C/HND/CO/2(Aug. 26, 2016) (stating its concern with the restrictions on access to abortion in Honduras, and
recommending the State to ensure that women who decide to terminate their pregnancy have access to safe, legal abortions), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15
/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2fC%2fHND%2fCO%2f2&
Lang=en.
Indeed, many violations of reproductive autonomy meet the definition of “incidents
which women experience as abusive are not defined legally as crimes.” KELLY, supra
note 23, at 76.

2022]

ADVANCING REPROD UCT IVE JUSTI CE

165

isolated but are connected through underlying patriarchal structures
that perpetuate the subordination of women to men in society. 41 These
patriarchal structures intersect with other forms of inequalities to shape
and heighten the forms of violence. Unless the underlying structural
dimensions are addressed, responses to violence will fail to have a transformative impact. In recognition of this, the Inter-American System for
the Protection of Human Rights has developed a comprehensive understanding of the challenges that impede the implementation of reproductive justice, including the “subordination of women in both the public
and private spheres, socio-cultural practices that place women’s role as
mothers before their role as autonomous individuals, and stereotypes,
policies and practices that give control and decision-making power to
men.”42
Using the continuum of violence, feminist scholars have also suggested the need to provide a gender perspective 43 “on the successive
moments in the flux of peace and war is not an optional extra but a
stark necessity.”44 A gender perspective challenges traditional patriarchal
definitions of what constitutes a society in conflict or in peace.45 It renders meaningless the flawed distinction between peace and war; any definition of peace as the absence of conflict is based on a male conception
of violence.46 Women experience systematic violence and discrimination
in times of peace as well. This logic has also been used by the CEDAW
Committee and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).47
41. Id. at 75-77.
42. Ciara O’Connell, Litigating Reproductive Health Rights in the Inter-American System:
What Does a Winning Case Look Like? 16 HEALTH & HUM. RTS. J. 116, 120 (2014).
43. Gender perspective is used here to mean a consideration of women’s experiences and
concerns by focusing on differences “on gender-based differences in status and power,
and considers how such discrimination shapes the immediate needs, as well as the longterm interests, of women and men.” Gender Perspective, EURO. INST. FOR GENDER
EQUAL., https://eige.europa.eu/thesaurus/terms/1197 [https://perma.cc/4L7L-DQ8C]
(last visited Aug. 29, 2021).
44. Cynthia Cockburn, The Continuum of Violence: A Gender Perspective on War and
Peace, in SITES OF VIOLENCE: GENDER AND CONFLICT ZONES 24, 25 (Wenona Giles
& Jennifer Hyndman eds., 2004).
45. See, e.g., Ruth Rubio-Marín & Dorothy Estrada-Tanck, Transitional Justice Standards
on Reparations for Women Subjected to Violence in the CEDAW Committee’s Evolving
Legal Practice, 14 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 566, 567 (2020).
46. See, e.g., Jacqui True, Continuums of Violence and Peace: A Feminist Perspective, 34
ETHICS & INT’L. AFFAIRS 85, 88 (2020) (arguing that defining peace as the absence
of organized violence presents a narrow and harmful understanding that does not
properly account for the “range of gender-based physical and nonphysical violence
and threats experienced by women and girls”).
47. See Part IV below.
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III. REPARATIONS IN THE TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE FIELD
Reparations constitute one of the fundamental pillars of transitional justice, together with accountability, truth recovery, institutional reform, and reconciliation.48 Compared to all these mechanisms, reparations represent a more victim-centered tool because they tailor measures
to victims’ needs.49 Reparations are also “the most tangible manifestation of the state’s efforts to remedy the harms victims have suffered.”50
They acknowledge the legal obligation of states to repair the consequences of human rights violations, either because the state directly
committed these violations, or because the state failed to prevent
them.51 Reparations serve to express to victims and society the state’s
commitment to addressing the root causes of past violations and ensuring that they do not happen again, helping to (re)build trust in the system. 52
The right to reparations under international law has become well
established,53 especially after the adoption of the 2005 Basic Principles
and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims
of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Basic Principles and
Guidelines). 54 These Basic Principles and Guidelines constitute the
48. See Alexander L. Boraine, Transitional Justice: A Holistic Interpretation, 60 J. INT’L
AFFAIRS 17, 19-24 (2006).
49. See, e.g., Luke Moffett, Transitional Justice and Reparations: Remedying the Past?, in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 377, 382 (Cheryl Lawther, Dov
Jacobs & Luke Moffett eds., 2017); see also Fionnuala Ní Aolaín, Catherine
O’Rourke, & Aisling Swaine, Transforming Reparations for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence: Principles and Practice, 28 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 97, 109 (2015) (noting that
reparations are “the most victim-centered of existing transitional justice mechanisms
and encompass material and symbolic forms of redress[]”).
50. Boraine, supra note 48, at 24.
51. Rubio-Marín & Estrada-Tanck, supra note 45, at 566.
52. Id. at 567.
53. Ruth Rubio-Marín, The Gender of Reparations in Transitional Societies, in THE
GENDER OF REPARATIONS: UNSETTLING SEXUAL HIERARCHIES WHILE REDRESSING
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 63, 68 (Ruth Rubio-Marin ed., 2009).
54. UN General Assembly, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law
and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law [hereinafter Basic Principles and Guidelines] UN Doc. A/RES/60/147, (Dec. 16, 2005). Restitution restores
“the victim to the original situation” before the violation; compensation provides for
“any economically assessable damage, as appropriate and proportional to the gravity
of the violation and the circumstances of each case;” rehabilitation “include[s] medical and psychological care as well as legal and social services;” satisfaction can include
the verification of facts and full and public disclosure of the truth, the search of the
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most significant global effort to codify existing standards relating to the
right to reparations for the purpose of redressing gross violations of human rights.55 They identify the following types of reparations: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and guarantees of nonrepetition. 56 All of them are necessary to repair the harm and avoid redundancy.
However, the Basic Principles and Guidelines are silent on women’s experiences, particularly because they focus exclusively on violations
of civil and political rights and violations committed in the public
sphere. Because of this, civil society organizations met in 2007 in Nairobi and developed the Nairobi Declaration on the Right to Remedy
and Reparation of Women and Girls (2007) (Nairobi Declaration) to
supplement them.57 The Nairobi Declaration calls for the inclusion of a
gender perspective in the design of reparations 58 based on two key principles: Reparations involve the transformation of society as a whole (addressing the root causes that enabled the violence to take place) and the
participation of women is integral to this process. 59 The Declaration
takes into account the “particular circumstances in which women and
girls are made victims of crimes and human rights violations in situations of conflict require approaches specially adapted to their needs, interests and priorities, as defined by them.”60 With this, the Declaration
specifically aimed to give a voice to women and girls who are survivors
of sexual violence. 61
There are two main forms of discharging state’s obligations to provide reparations: judicial reparations and administrative reparation programs. 62 Judicial reparations permit the assessment of violations on a
case-by-case basis and decide compensation in strict proportion to

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

whereabouts of the disappeared, an official declaration or judicial decision restoring
dignity and the reputation of the victim, a public apology, commemorations, etc.;
and guarantees of non-repetition ensure that the harm is not repeated. Id. at ¶¶ 1923.
Pamina Firchow, Do Reparations Repair Relationships? Setting the Stage for Reconciliation in Colombia, 11 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 315 (2017).
Basic Principles and Guidelines, supra note 54, at 18.
Valérie Couillard, The Nairobi Declaration: Redefining Reparations for Women Victims
of Sexual Violence, 1 INT’L J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 444 (2007).
NAIROBI DECLARATION ON THE RIGHT OF WOMEN AND GIRLS TO A REMEDY AND
REPARATION, § 3, at 4 (2007), https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/NAIROBI
_DECLARATIONeng.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M6C-NWMJ].
Couillard, supra note 57, at 450.
Id.
Id. at 456.
Ruth Rubio-Marín & Pablo de Greiff, Women and Reparations, 1 INT’L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 318, 321 (2007).
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harm.63 Legislative and administrative reparation programs access a wider pool of victims of different violations. 64 Here, I will exclusively focus
on judicial reparations, as courts are increasingly using a gender perspective to award reparations that have transformational potential. I do so
while acknowledging the obstacles to accessing judicial reparations, including the high cost of litigation and the inordinately lengthy litigation
process. 65
In the case of judicial reparations, Rubio-Marín and Sandoval propose that courts employ a “holistic approach” to ensure that courts adequately address women’s needs in their reparation schemes, 66 as courts
have traditionally not been successful in including a gender perspective
in awarding reparations and in transforming pre-existing situations for
women and girls. The holistic approach is developed in response to the
IACtHR’s inability to devise reparation schemes that sufficiently challenged sexual hierarchies or improved outcomes for women and girls in
the long run.67 In order to provide meaningful remedies, courts should
start with the relevant facts, violations, victims, and the proper assessment of harms that accompany the violations. 68 It is essential to determine these preconditions to be able to respond properly to the violations. Then, courts should consider what type of reparation both
improves the starting position of victims and helps to dismantle the
structural conditions that enabled the violations to take place. 69 Whenever possible, reparations should be transformative, aiming “to subvert,
instead of reinforcing pre-existing structural . . . inequalities and thereby
to contribute, however, minimally, to the consolidation of more inclusive democratic regimes.”70 These transformative reparations can be
achieved with the creative use of the different modalities of reparations,
particularly through guarantees of non-repetition “given their preventive
role as well as potential reach.”71
In the case of violence against women, transformative reparations
should also aim at recognizing and reinforcing women’s role as social
and economic actors, including by promoting the active participation of
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 322.
Ruth Rubio-Marín & Clara Sandoval, Engendering the Reparations Jurisprudence of the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Promise of the Cotton Field Judgment, 33
HUM. RTS. Q. 1062, 1064-71 (2011).
Id. at 1064.
Id.
Id.
Rubio-Marín, supra note 53, at 66.
Rubio-Marín & Sandoval, supra note 66, at 1071.
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women as citizens.72 For instance, reparations should assert women’s full
agency over their reproductive autonomy. They should also specifically,
although not exclusively, address gender stereotypes of women as mothers that limit their full access to their citizenship rights, 73 and stereotypes
of what type of women are deemed a fit or unfit mother—thus legitimizing discrimination and violence to the latter. 74
IV. REPARATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES
Reparations have increasingly been applied by international and regional human rights bodies to address structural discrimination against
women in consolidated democracies, by drawing from reparation standards developed within transitional justice contexts.

72. Sanne Weber, From Victims and Mother to Citizens: Gender-Just Transformative Reparations and the Need for Public and Private Transitions, 12 INT’L J. TRANSIT.IONAL
JUST. 88, 105 (2018).
73. Laws restricting access to abortion are based on ideas that a woman’s role in society is
to become a mother. The criminalization of abortion is based on the assumption that
women are obliged to devote themselves to the work of raising children, and the
states will only subordinate the welfare of the unborn to that of the mother when the
state judges that women have a reason for avoiding motherhood sufficiently weighty,
such as a risk to her life. See Reva B. Siegel, Siegel, J., Concurring, in WHAT ROE V
WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, 63, 63-82 (Jack Balkin ed., 2005). Similarly, legislation
in most countries has been based on ideas of women as mothers and wives. For example, limitations are imposed on night work or on working in certain jobs that are
dangerous or that might affect women’s capacity to later become pregnant. See, e.g.,
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (holding that a statute prohibiting women
from being employed in any mechanical establishment, such as factories and laundries, for more than 10 hours a day was constitutional, as the differences between the
sexes justify having different rules, specifically based on a woman’s physical structure
and performance of maternal functions. “Healthy mothers are essential to vigorous
offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and
care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.” Id. at 421; Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfGE), 1992 Nocturnal Employment Case, 85 191 (Ger.) (the
court examines the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting female employees from
working at night in certain jobs).
74. States also engage in practices that restrict women’s access to motherhood when they
are not considered “fit” for motherhood. A common form of limiting women’s access
to motherhood is through forced sterilization of certain women. For example, this
occurs in the cases of I.V. v. Bolivia and María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru
(2003). I.V. v. Bolivia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 329, ¶¶ 64-70 (Nov. 30, 2016); Mestanza Chávez v. Peru, Case 12.191, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 71/03, OEA
/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2 ¶ 14 (2003).
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A. International Human Rights Bodies
The CEDAW Committee is a body of independent experts that
monitors the implementation of the CEDAW.75 Its duties include interpreting the CEDAW through general recommendations, 76 considering State Party Reports on measures adopted to give effect to the
CEDAW,77 and examining communications from those State Parties
that have ratified the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW. These latter
communications are reports of violations of the CEDAW that are submitted on behalf of individuals or groups of individuals under the jurisdiction of a State Party. 78 After reviewing the communication, the
CEDAW Committee presents its views and makes non-binding recommendations.
The CEDAW Committee started to advocate for reparations as a
response to violence against women in 2005.79 In doing so, the
CEDAW Committee has relied on the parameters of transformative
reparations developed in the transitional justice field that have influenced the adjudication of reparations in consolidated democracies. 80 As
explained below, the use of transformative reparations has proven particularly effective in cases of sexual and reproductive rights violations.
In L.C. v. Peru (2011), a 13-year-old girl became pregnant following a rape.81 She attempted suicide by jumping from a building and was
taken to the hospital for emergency surgery to prevent her injuries from
leading to a permanent disability, but her treatment was denied as it was
contraindicated during pregnancy. She then sought to have legal termination of her pregnancy but was denied this service. When reviewing
this case, the CEDAW Committee recommended that Peru review its
legislation and decriminalize abortion when the pregnancy results from
rape, 82 making it the first time an international body explicitly directs a

75. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 17.
76. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: General Recommendations,
UNITED NATIONS HUM. RIGHTS OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R, https://www.ohchr.org/EN
/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/Recommendations.aspx [https://perma.cc/P4PY-Y2F2].
77. CEDAW, supra note 1, art. 18.
78. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 2, Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 U.N.T.S. 83.
79. Rubio-Marín & Estrada-Tanck, supra note 45, at 2.
80. Id.
81. L.C. v. Peru, CEDAW Committee, Comm. No. 22/2009, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/50
/D/22/2009, ¶ 2.1 (Oct. 17, 2011).
82. L.C., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/50/D/22/2009 at ¶ 12(b)(ii).
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state to liberalize its abortion legislation. 83 This case illustrates how the
CEDAW Committee is increasingly trying to capture the specificity of
reproductive harms when it comes to recommending adequate forms of
reparations, even those that require legal reforms. 84
Alyne da Silva Pimentel v. Brazil (2011) is the first case on maternal
mortality decided by an international human rights body. 85 In Brazil,
preventable maternal death disproportionately affects low-income, AfroBrazilian, and indigenous women, as well as women living in rural areas
and in the Brazilian north and northeast. 86 Alyne da Silva Pimental was
an Afro-Brazilian who experienced health complications during her
pregnancy, and was given medication to induce the delivery of her stillborn fetus. 87 Her health worsened and she had to be transferred to a superior facility. Only one public hospital had available space for her but
refused to use their only ambulance to transport her at that time despite
her critical condition, and only did so after eight hours. At the new hospital, she continued facing mistreatment and died from a digestive hemorrhage. The doctors confirmed that this was a result from the delivery
of the stillborn fetus. 88 The CEDAW Committee concluded that the
mistreatment Alyne experienced from the health services resulted from
systematic discrimination in the Brazilian health system against AfroBrazilian, low-income, and rural women.89 They recommended transformative reparations to address this systematic discrimination and to
improve the treatment of pregnant women—including ensuring affordable access to adequate emergency obstetric care for all women, training
health workers, ensuring compliance with national and international
standards in private healthcare facilities, and reducing preventable maternal death. 90 By making these recommendations, the CEDAW Committee aimed to avoid the repetition of preventable maternal death in

83. See Charles G Ngwena, A Commentary on LC v Peru: The CEDAW Committee’s First
Decision on Abortion, 57 J. AFRICAN L. 310 (2013) (providing a commentary of this
case and its importance as the first decision of the CEDAW Committee on Abortion).
84. Rubio-Marín & Estrada-Tanck, supra, note 45, at 581.
85. Center for Reproductive Rights, Alyne v. Brazil: Case of Alyne da Silva Pimentel Teixeira
(“Alyne”) v. Brazil, https://www.reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files
/documents/LAC_Alyne_Factsheet_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/EEE6-KM3G].
86. Id.
87. Alyne da Silva Pimentel v. Brazil, CEDAW Committee, Comm. No. 17/2008, U.N.
Doc. CEDAW/C/49/177/2008, ¶ 2.5 (Sept. 27, 2011).
88. Pimentel, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/49/177/2008 at ¶¶ 2.1-2.12.
89. Pimentel, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/49/177/2008 at ¶¶ 7.4, 7.6.
90. Pimentel, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/49/177/2008 at ¶ 8.
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the future and to ensure the amelioration of the treatment of pregnant
women in Brazil.
S.F.M. v. Spain (2020) is the first case on obstetric violence decided
by the CEDAW Committee.91 During S.M.F.’s pregnancy, she was subjected to a series of unnecessary interventions, such as up to ten digital
vaginal examinations that caused her an infection which was then transferred to her daughter, the administration of intravenous oxytocin to
induce the labor without her consent, an unnecessary episiotomy, inability to move and be forced to give birth in the lithotomy position, and
an immediate separation from her daughter after birth.92 The CEDAW
Committee found that the presence of these interventions was due to
the presence of “structural discrimination based on gender stereotypes
regarding sexuality, maternity and childbirth.” 93 These were carried out
without providing her with the necessary information nor obtaining her
consent,94 and had a significant adverse effect on S.M.F.’s physical and
mental health, her psychological integrity and health of her baby. 95
S.F.M. requested that the CEDAW Committee recommend that
Spain issue transformative reparations to ensure that these practices do
not continue.96 This case is a great example of how reparations add to
survivor’s satisfaction – as S.F.M. specifically asked for these reparations
to avoid the recurrence of obstetric violence in Spanish hospitals to other women. This turned her from a victim-survivor into an agent of
change.97 The CEDAW Committee recommended Spain to conduct a
study on obstetric violence to shed light on the prevalence of this form
of violence and provide guidance for public policies to combat such violence; ensure women’s right to safe motherhood and appropriate obstetric services, including by requiring free, prior, and informed consent for
invasive treatments; respect women’s autonomy; and train health per-

91. Spain needs to combat obstetric violence - UN experts, UNITED NATIONS HUM. RIGHTS
OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R (March 9, 2020), https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents
/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25688&LangID=e [https://perma.cc/Q9X6-2CE].
92. S.F.M. v. Spain, CEDAW Committee, Comm. No. 138/2018, U.N. Doc. CEDAW
/C/75/D/138/2018, ¶¶ 2.1-2.6, 3.1 (Feb. 3, 2020).
93. S.F.M., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/75/D/138/2018 at ¶ 7.2.
94. S.F.M., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/75/D/138/2018 at ¶¶ 2.1-2.9 (the procedures included up to ten digital vaginal examinations that caused her to have an infection
which was then transferred to her daughter; the administration of intravenous oxytocin to induce the labor without her consent; an unnecessary episiotomy; inability to
move, which forced her to give birth in the lithotomy position; and an immediate
separation from her daughter after birth).
95. S.F.M., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/75/D/138/2018 at ¶ 2.7.
96. S.F.M., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/75/D/138/2018 at ¶ 3.10.
97. Rubio-Marín & Estrada-Tanck, supra note 45, at 13-14.
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sonnel and judicial and law enforcement personnel. 98 Significantly,
some of these recommendations aim to further women’s agency during
childbirth by addressing the acute power imbalances between patients
and healthcare personnel.99
In S.N. and E.R. v. North Macedonia (2020), the CEDAW Committee addressed the eviction of two minor girls of Roma origin who
were pregnant, alongside other minors and adults.100 After being evicted
by government authorities, they were left with no shelter, no access to
water and nowhere to go.101 Neither of the two girls had public or private health insurance nor did they receive social support, 102 and they
were left without access to their basic needs and without any maternal
health-care assistance.103
The CEDAW Committee acknowledged the intersecting forms of
discrimination against Roma women based on their gender, age, ethnicity, and health conditions.104 It further stated that in evicting the minors
without ensuring “appropriate alternative housing, health and maternal
care” the state “did not consider their extremely vulnerable situation and
the particularly disproportionate and discriminatory effect on Roma
pregnant adolescents.” 105 The CEDAW Committee recommended that
the state guarantees several economic and social rights, including access
to adequate housing, poverty alleviation, and affordable health and reproductive health services.106 The recommendation of these socioeconomic rights is essential to ensure the transformative effect of reparations, especially in a context where Roma women and girls are systematically discriminated against and do not have access to the socioeconomic rights on an equal basis to the non-Roma population. Although not directly a reproductive autonomy case, the CEDAW Committee is advancing a more nuanced understanding of how intersectional discrimination heightens and shapes violations of women’s
reproductive autonomy. These violations do not only occur through the
denial of access to reproductive and sexual health rights, but also by not
creating an environment where women can access these rights, such as
in the case where women’s socio-economic rights are not guaranteed.
98. S.F.M., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/75/D/138/2018 at ¶ 8.
99. See S.F.M., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/75/D/138/2018 at ¶ 8.
100. S.N. and E.R. v. North Macedonia, CEDAW Committee, Comm. No. 107/2016,
U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/75/D/107/2016, ¶ 1.1 (Mar. 19, 2020).
101. S.N. and E.R., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/75/D/107/2016 at ¶ 2.9.
102. S.N. and E.R., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/75/D/107/2016 at ¶ 2.4.
103. S.N. and E.R., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/75/D/107/2016 at ¶ 2.9.
104. S.N. and E.R., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/75/D/107/2016 at ¶ 9.2.
105. S.N. and E.R., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/75/D/107/2016 at ¶ 9.2.
106. S.N. and E.R., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/75/D/107/2016 at ¶ 11.
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The CEDAW Committee took into account the context within which
the violations happened, to design reparations that can adequately address the root causes of such violations and avoid their repetition.
Finally, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has also reviewed
some cases on reproductive justice and, while not developing the reparations in the same systematic manner as the CEDAW Committee, it did
remind states of their obligation to take steps to prevent similar violations in the future, 107 and even recommended transformative reparations in more recent cases. These types of transformative reparations are
seen in the case of Amanda Jane Mellet v. Ireland (2017) 108 and its companion case Siobhán Whelan v. Ireland (2017).109 Amanda and Siobhán
were denied access to abortion despite having a fetal impairment that
would result in the death of the fetus in utero or shortly after birth, and
both had to travel to the United Kingdom from Ireland to obtain an
abortion. Apart from the economic cost and psychological impact of arranging the trip and leaving their country “feeling like ‘a criminal,’”110
once back in Ireland neither Amanda nor Siobhán could access aftercare
assistance or bereavement counselling.111 All of this had caused them
psychological, physical and financial consequence. 112 To prevent similar
violations occurring in the future, the Committee held that Ireland
should:
amend its law on voluntary termination of pregnancy, including, if necessary, its Constitution, to ensure compliance
with the Covenant, including with respect to ensuring effec-

107. K.L. v. Peru, Hum, Rts. Comm., Commc’n No. 1153/2003, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C
/85/D/1153/2003, ¶ 8 (Nov. 22, 2005); L.M.R., Commc’n No. 1608/2007, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007 at ¶ 11.
108. Amanda Jane Mellet v. Ireland, Hum. Rts. Comm., Commc’n No. 2324/2013, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 (Nov. 17, 2016).
109. Siobhán Whelan v. Ireland, Hum. Rts. Comm., Commc’n No. 2425/2014, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014 (July 11, 2017).
110. Whelan, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014 at ¶ 2.4.
111. Mellet, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 at ¶ 2.5 (the hospital only provided
bereavement counseling for couples who have suffered a spontaneous stillbirth, not
for women who had voluntarily terminated their pregnancy as a result of fatal fetal
impairments). See also Whelan, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014 at ¶¶ 2.4,
2.6, 3.2 (Whelan was given information about bereavement services in the United
Kingdom, but she did not have any information on similar services in Ireland. Once
in Ireland, the doctor never offered any grief counseling. The healthcare system
abandoned their care for her, including through their failure to provide her with any
counseling services or information about her options).
112. See Mellet, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/116/D/2324/2013 at ¶¶ 2.4–2.5, 7.10; Whelan,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014 at ¶ 7.11.
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tive, timely and accessible procedures for pregnancy termination in Ireland, and take measures to ensure that health-care
providers are in a position to supply full information on safe
abortion services without fearing being subjected to criminal
sanctions. 113
Therefore, the Human Rights Committee also embraced the need to
recommend far-reaching measures of non-repetition to ensure that human rights violations do not take place again, including through the
amendment of a constitution.
B. Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights
While the CEDAW Committee has more recently started developing its jurisprudence on reparations, the Inter-American System for the
Protection of Human Rights has substantially developed an understanding of gender-sensitive reparations. In the milestone case of González et
al. (Cotton Field) v. Mexico (2009), 114 the IACtHR articulated for the
first time the need to provide reparations that do justice to women.115
This case dealt with the femicides of young women committed by nonstate actors in Ciudad Juarez.116 Laura Berenice Ramos Monárrez,
Claudia Ivette González, and Esmeralda Herrera Monreal, all of “humble origins” disappeared after work. 117 Their bodies, together with bodies of other women, were found in the cotton fields of Ciudad Juarez
and showed evidence of torture, mutilation, and sexual violence. 118 Although this case occurred against a backdrop of a “critical situation of
violence against women,” the state response was inadequate, failing to
clarify the femicides and the irregularities in the investigations had given
rise to a climate of impunity.119 Since 1993, the number of disappearances and femicides of women and girls in Ciudad Juárez, especially
those working in the maquila industry, had been increasing. 120 In this
case, the IACtHR used reparations to address the root causes of this sit113. Whelan, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/119/D/2425/2014 at ¶ 9.
114. González et al. (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 (Nov. 16, 2009).
115. Rubio-Marín & Sandoval, supra note 66, at 1063.
116. Id. at 1077.
117. González et al. (“Cotton Field”), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 at ¶ 165-68.
118. González et al. (“Cotton Field”), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 at ¶ 277.
119. González et al. (“Cotton Field”), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 at ¶ 114, 146.
120. González et al. (“Cotton Field”), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 at ¶¶ 113-14,
122-23, 129, 166, 189.
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uation to avoid further disappearances, and developed the concept of
“integral reparations”:
“The concept of “integral reparation” (restitutio in integrum)
entails the re-establishment of the previous situation and the
elimination of the effects produced by the violation, as well as
the payment of compensation for the damage caused. However, bearing in mind the context of structural discrimination
in which the facts of this case occurred, which was acknowledged by the State . . . reparations must be designed to
change this situation, so that their effect is not only of restitution, but also of rectification. In this regard, reestablishment
of the same structural context of violence and discrimination
is not acceptable.”121
Reparations in these cases should “restore the victims to their situation
prior to the violation insofar as possible, to the extent that this does not
interfere with the obligation not to discriminate; . . . identify and eliminate the factors that cause discrimination; . . . [and] adopt [] . . . a gender perspective, bearing in mind the different impact that violence has
on men and on women . . . .”122 The Cotton Field case was the first time
where the IACtHR articulated the need to provide reparations that do
justice to women.123 It established the parameters to follow when ordering reparations from a gender perspective, ensuring that the root causes
that enabled the violation to take place in the first place are addressed.
These parameters have been used in the cases on reproductive justice.
At the same time, the Inter-American System for the Protection of
Human Rights has increasingly become a forum for the advancement of
reproductive justice, both through the Interamerican Court of Human
Rights and the Interamerican Commission of Human Rights.124 There
are four main cases on reproductive justice, two of which concluded in a
friendly settlement and were therefore not reviewed by the IACtHR.125
121. González et al. (“Cotton Field”), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205 ¶ 450.
122. González et al. (“Cotton Field”), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, at ¶ 451. These
are the elements that Rubio-Marín and Sandoval describe as the basis for transformative reparation. See Rubio-Marín & Sandoval, supra note 66.
123. Rubio-Marín & Sandoval, supra note 66, at 1063.
124. CIARA O’CONNELL, WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND REPARATIONS: LESSONS
FROM THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2016), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2854922 [https://perma.cc/R62W-N5MK].
125. A “friendly settlement” is the way that the American Convention on Human Rights
refers to a settlement between the petitioners and the relevant state. It is a voluntary
agreement which may include public recognition, acceptance of responsibility by the
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One such case, María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Peru (2003), is the
first case admitted on reproductive justice in the Inter-American System
for the Protection of Human Rights. 126 The case centered around government-sponsored policies of forced sterilization of women in marginalized communities, especially indigenous women.127 In this friendly settlement, Peru recognized its international responsibility and pledged to
amend its legislation and policies on reproductive health and family
planning to eliminate any discrimination and respect women’s autonomy.128 This case laid the groundwork for designing reparations that address structural factors in future cases, as it identified discrimination as
being a basis for women’s reproductive rights violations, and the latter
cases relied on this friendly settlement to award reparations. 129
In Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto v. Mexico (2007), a young
girl became pregnant as a result of rape.130 She sought an abortion, but
was prevented by the state authorities, one of whom even took her to a
Roman Catholic priest to dissuade her from exercising her right to an
abortion. 131 After her case was brought before the Interamerican Commission of Human Rights, Mexico agreed to a friendly settlement. The
settlement contained a wide range of reparation measures, including
payments for Paulina’s legal, medical, and housing expenses, an education grant for each academic year and a grant to set up a microenterprise, economic compensation for the moral damages, and measures of
satisfaction such as a public acknowledgement of the government’s responsibility published in local newspapers. 132 Yet, despite dealing with

126.

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

132.

state, and introduces reparation measures. See Organization of American States,
American Convention on Human Rights, arts. 48, 49, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S.
No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; Rules of Procedure of Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., art.
40, (2013); Impact of the Friendly Settlement, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (2018), at ¶¶ 3-4.
María Mamerita Mestanza Chávez v. Perú (Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos), CTR. FOR REPRODUTIVE RTS., https://reproductiverights.org/es/case/mariamamerita-mestanza-chavez-v-peru-inter-american-commission-on-human-rights/
[https://perma.cc/6SKW-BU9H] (Mar. 18, 2021).
See Mestanza Chávez v. Peru, Case 12.191, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 71
/03, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.118, doc. 5 rev. 2 ¶ 9 (2003).
Mestanza Chávez, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 71/03 at ¶ 14.
See O’Connell, Litigating Reproductive Health Rights in the Inter-American System,
supra note 42, at 121.
Ramírez Jacinto v. Mexico, Case 161/02, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 21
/07, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111, doc. 22, rev. ¶ 9 (2007).
Ramírez Jacinto, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 21/07, at ¶ 11 (“[T]he State
Attorney General, in order to dissuade Paulina del Carmen Ramírez Jacinto from exercising her right to a legal abortion, took her and her mother to a Roman Catholic
priest.”).
Ramírez Jacinto, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 21/07, at ¶ 16.
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reproductive justice, this agreement did not contain any specific reference to reproductive rights and failed to analyze the correlation between
religion and the discriminatory attitudes of health personnel associated
with reproductive violation133
In Artavia Murillo et al v. Costa Rica (2012), the IACtHR itself had
its first opportunity to address violations of reproductive autonomy.134
The Costa Rican Decree Law No. 24029-S authorized in vitro fertilization (IVF) for married couples and regulated its practice.135 In 2000, the
Decree Law was declared unconstitutional and annulled by the Constitutional Chamber of the Costa Rican Supreme Court, which determined that IVF jeopardizes the life and dignity of the human being.136
The Costa Rican Court interpreted the concept of “life” as beginning
“as soon as conception occurs” per the American Convention on Human Rights. 137
In this case, the IACtHR expanded the right to private life to include reproductive autonomy and access to reproductive health services, 138 provided that the embryo cannot be recognized as a person nor
have a right to life,139 and discussed the role of gender in reproductive
health. 140 This was especially relevant because the petitioner and the
Commission had not adequately focused on gendered implications of
the IVF ban.141 Despite the groundbreaking decision for advancing reproductive justice, the IACtHR limited the awards of reparations to
those sought by the petitioners and Commission: compensation for the
133. O’Connell, supra note 42, at 121.
134. Since the two previous cases examined were settled before the Commission, the Court
did not review them.
135. Artavia Murillo et al. (In vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257,
¶¶ 68-70 (Nov. 28, 2012).
136. In vitro fertilization, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 at ¶¶ 72-74 (citing Judgment No. 2000-02306 of March 15, 2000, delivered by the Constitutional Chamber
of the Supreme Court of Justice, Case file No. 95-001734-007-CO (file of annexes
to the merits report, volume I, folios 76 to 96)).
137. In vitro fertilization, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 at ¶ 73 (quoting Judgment
No. 2000-02306 of March 15, 2000, delivered by the Constitutional Chamber of the
Supreme Court of Justice, Case file No. 95-001734-007-CO (file of annexes to the
merits report, volume I, folios 88, 89)). The Constitutional Chamber held that “[i]n
short, as soon as conception occurs, a person is a person and we are in the presence of
a living being, with the right to be protected by the legal system.” Id.
138. In vitro fertilization, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 at ¶ 146.
139. In vitro fertilization, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 at ¶ 264.
140. In vitro fertilization, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 at ¶¶ 294-302.
141. Ciara O’Connell, Engendering Reproductive Rights in the Inter-American System, in
GENDER, SEXUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? 58,
62 (Kay Lalor et al. eds., 2016).
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material and immaterial harm caused,142 rehabilitation (psychological
and psychiatric assistance to the victims that desire it),143 satisfaction
(the publication of the ruling of the IACtHR) 144, the reversal of the IVF
ban, and training the judiciary on reproductive rights.145 These reparations did not specifically address the role of gender in reproductive violations in the first place, and minimally challenged gender stereotypes
and discrimination.146
Finally, in I.V. v. Bolivia (2016), the IACtHR heard the case of a
Peruvian refugee who had been forcibly sterilized.147 I.V. delivered her
third daughter through a cesarean section. During the procedure, the
doctors also performed a bilateral tubal ligation. 148 I.V. had not given
her consent for the tubal ligation. 149 When the IACtHR reviewed the
case, they awarded reparations that established education programs for
health providers on informed consent, gender-based discrimination and
violence, and gender stereotypes.150
Through these cases, the IACtHR has recognized the underlying
causes of discrimination against women, and partly addressed some of
them through the reparations awarded. These non-repetition efforts are
paramount. However, the Court has missed opportunities to significantly address many of the root causes of reproductive violations. Reparations like these could have tackled the relationship that exists between
the Catholic Church and the state, and other sociocultural practices that
contribute to inequality, discrimination, and violence. 151 Advocates
have long criticized the Commission for not focusing enough on reparations or for not sufficiently centralizing and mainstreaming considerations of gender.152 Indeed, as Rubio-Marín and Sandoval suggest, they
should “not shy away from the opportunity to trigger broader structural
reform” through reparations.153
As of the time of this writing, the IACtHR is reviewing the case
Manuela and Others v. El Salvador, which centers on a woman who was
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

In vitro fertilization, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, at ¶¶ 349-63.
In vitro fertilization, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, at ¶¶ 324-26.
In vitro fertilization, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, at ¶¶ 327-29.
In vitro fertilization, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, at ¶ 381.
O’Connell, Engendering Reproductive Rights in the Inter-American System, supra note
141, at 62.
See I.V. v. Bolivia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 329, at ¶¶ 61-70.
I.V., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 329, at ¶ 64.
I.V., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 329 at ¶ 65.
I.V., Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 329 at ¶ 341.
O’Connell, supra note 42, at 122.
E.g., O’Connell, supra note 141, at 63.
Rubio-Marín & Sandoval, supra note 66, at 1090.
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sentenced to thirty years in prison after suffering an obstetric emergency
and losing her pregnancy. 154 She was found guilty of aggravated homicide. Two years after her imprisonment, she died from cancer after having received inadequate medical treatment.155 When deciding this case,
the court will essentially be ruling on the total ban on abortion in El
Salvador, which has led to the imprisonment of countless women who
have suffered pregnancy-related complications and miscarriages.156 This
case presents a new opportunity for the court to provide reparations that
can have a transformative effect, especially given the potential to amend
the Salvadorian Criminal Code to decriminalize abortion.
V. REPARATIONS IN CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
A. Overview of the Region
Latin America is a region with restrictive abortion laws, including
some total bans, which have led to the imprisonment of women for miscarriages 157 or pushed many women to seek illegal abortions, with resultant risks to their health and life. 158 The presence of unlawful barriers
to access abortions even in the cases permitted by law, including the attempts of the religious groups to limit women’s access to abortion, has
forced girls as young as ten or twelve years old to give birth to children
that are a result of rape. 159 Many women who have been sterilized by the
154. Manuela v. El Salvador (Inter-American Court of Human Rights), CTR. FOR
REPRODUCTIVE RTS. (March 10, 2021) https://perma.cc/C9JF-TTYA.
155. Id.
156. Press Release, supra note 9. Section 133 of the Salvadoran Criminal Code provides
that whoever performs an abortion with the consent of the women, or the women
who causes her own abortion or consents to other person to perform it, will be punished with two to eight years on imprisonment. Decreto No. 1030, Código Penal
[Criminal Code], sec. 133, (26 Apr. 1997 (El Sal.).
157. See, e.g., Nina Lakhani, El Salvador: Where Women May Be Jailed for Miscarrying,
BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-24532694
[https://perma.cc/XNQ9-JHHF].
158. Nicaragua: Prohibición del Aborto Supone Riesgo para la Salud y la Vida, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Jul. 31, 2017, 8:55 AM), https://www.hrw.org/es/news/2017/07/31
/nicaragua-prohibicion-del-aborto-supone-riesgo-para-la-salud-y-la-vida [https://perma.cc
/LB2A-JFUC].
159. See, e.g., L.M.R. v. Argentina, Hum. Rts. Comm., Commc’n No. 1608/2007, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/101/D/1608/2007, ¶¶ 3.1-.3 (April 28, 2011); Una Niña de 12 Años
Tiene un Bebé Fruto de la Violación de su Padrastro, LA VANGUARDIA (Nov. 28, 2019,
9:35 AM), https://www.lavanguardia.com/sucesos/20191128/471926467250/argentinamorteros-nina-doce-bebe-violacion-padrastro-madre-abuso-sexual.html [https://perma.cc
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state have still not achieved any type of justice.160 Race and ethnicity
remain powerful determinants for women’s access to adequate reproductive healthcare, resulting in high numbers of preventable maternal
deaths. 161
At the same time, Latin America is a region with a strong feminist
movement that has been advancing women’s citizenship. 162 There have
been some milestones in the last decades regarding reproductive justice.
For example, in 2020 the Argentinian Senate finally approved the Law
to Access the Voluntary Termination of the Pregnancy, which allows
abortion for any reason up to fourteen weeks, and limits abortion to
cases of rape or risk to the health or life of the mother after that point.163
This followed a 2012 case from the Argentinian National Supreme
Court of Justice that expanded the exception to the criminalization of
abortion to all women who have become pregnant as a result of sexual
violence.164
In April 2021, the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court also declared
the provision 150 (2) of the Criminal Code that permitted only women
with mental disabilities to have an abortion when the pregnancy was a
result of rape to be unconstitutional. 165 The court further held that all

160.

161.
162.

163.

164.

165.

/X9XD-J93X] (explaining that a 12-year-old girl was forced to give birth to a child
that was a result of a rape by her stepfather).
Esterilización Forzosa en Perú: La Lucha de una Mujer que Pide Justicia y Reparación,
NACIONES UNIDAS DERECHOS HUMANOS OFICINA DEL ALTO COMISIONADO (Jun.
26, 2019), https://www.ohchr.org/SP/NewsEvents/Pages/MariaElenaCarbajal.aspx
[https://perma.cc/L3A3-RZFJ] (reporting that many of the women who were sterilized are still waiting for their reparations from the Peruvian government).
See, e.g., Alyne da Silva Pimentel Teixeria v. Brazil, CEDAW Committee, Comm.
No. 17/2008, U.N. Docs. CEDAW/C/49/177/2008, ¶ 2.5-12 (Sept. 27, 2011).
See, e.g., Zoë Carpenter, This Was the Decade of Feminist Uprisings in Latin America,
THE NATION (Dec. 31, 2019), https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/ecuadorabortion-green-wave/ [https://perma.cc/LKE2-LXZN] (the feminist movement in
Latin America supporting the legalization of abortion has often been called the “green
wave”); Vanessa Barbara, Latin America’s Radical Feminism Is Spreading, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/opinion/latin-americafeminism.html [https://perma.cc/6LEF-JSE8].
Senado de Argentina aprueba proyecto de ley que legaliza el aborto, CNN (Dec. 30,
2020, 7:17 AM), https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2020/12/30/senado-de-argentinaaprueba-proyecto-de-ley-que-legaliza-el-aborto/ [https://perma.cc/HZA2-3E8J]; Law
No. 27610, Jan. 15, 2021, 34.562 B.O. 3 (Arg.), art. 4.
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
13/03/2012, “F., A. L. s/ medida autosatisfactiva,” Fallos (2012-335-200) (Arg.) (before this case, Article 83(2) of the Argentinian Criminal Code only permitted abortions in cases where the health and life of the mother was in danger or the pregnancy
was a of result of rape, but only when the pregnant women had a mental disability).
Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of Ecuador], 28/4/2021,
“J.P: Karla Andrade Quevedo,” No. 34-19-IN / 21 (Ecuador) (this decision contains
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women and girls should be permitted to have an abortion when the
pregnancy is a result of rape. 166 In 2006, the Colombian Constitutional
Court declared that the total ban on abortion was a violation of women’s human rights, and decriminalized abortion in the following cases:
(1) when the pregnancy is a threat to the life or the health of the mother; (2) when the fetus has a grave malformation that makes it incompatible with life; and (3) when the pregnancy is a result of sexual violence,
unconsented artificial insemination, or incest. 167
Examining how reparations for reproductive justice have been developing in national courts in this region is important for several reasons. Latin American countries have substantially incorporated international and regional human rights standards into their domestic
legislation, and courts rely on these standards to interpret their legislation, including in shaping the content of women’s human rights or an
expansive concept of reparations. 168 Secondly, national courts are awarding integral reparations—that is, reparations that include all or some of
the five types of reparations established in the Basic Principles and
Guidelines. 169 This represents a potential avenue for litigators to advance reproductive justice nationally and avoid the lengthier processes of
regional and international bodies. Finally, it is a common practice in the
region for courts to use comparative law to interpret their own legislation, including in reproductive justice cases.170 Therefore, positive developments in one country can also have an impact in the advancement
of reproductive justice in others. The two next cases of the Ecuadorian
and Colombian Constitutional Courts illustrate these trends.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

important reparations, but it is not analyzed in detail here because it was decided
while this article was already being reviewed).
Id.
Rebecca J. Cook, Excerpts of the Constitutional Court’s Ruling that Liberalized
Abortion in Colombia, 15 Reproductive Health Matters 160, 160-61 (2007).
See discussions infra of Ecuador and Colombia.
See, e.g., Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of Ecuador], 13/12
/2019, “J.P: Ramiro Ávila Santamaría,” Sentencia No. 904-12-JP/19 (Ecuador).
See, e.g., Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of
Justice, 13/03/2012, “F., A. L. s/ medida autosatisfactiva,” Fallos (2012-335-200)
(Arg.), at 134-36, 142 (citing the Colombian law and the Constitutional Court decision
that liberalized abortion law in 2006); Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional
Court], 28 agosto 2017, Rol de la causa: 3729(3751)-17 CPT (Chile) (analyzing comparative law in the region and in other countries on the regulation of abortion and conscientious objection); see also Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo
10, 2006, Sentencia C-355/06 (Colom.), https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co
/relatoria/2006/c-355-06.htm [https://perma.cc/WFQ9-TQ2A] (engaging in a comparative analysis of the abortion legislation of various countries to support its reasoning).
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B. Ecuador
Article 86(3) of the Ecuadorian Constitution enshrines the right to
an “integral reparation.” 171 The Organic Law of Jurisdictional Guarantees and Constitutional Control (2009) further develops the right to integral reparations, providing that when there is a violation of human
rights, courts can order integral reparations, which includes compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction, guarantees of nonrecurrence and the obligation to investigate.172 In this section, I review
how the right to an integral reparation has been used to address reproductive justice, through the analysis of the case No. 904-12-JP/19
(2019) on obstetric violence. 173
1. Facts
Jessika del Rosario Nole Ochoa, pregnant with her fourth child,
sought healthcare after experiencing pains during the pregnancy.174 At
the hospital, this pain intensified and, although she was screaming for
help, nobody assisted her.175 She eventually gave birth to a child without any type of healthcare assistance.176 She testified that as she was delivering her newborn, she even had to grab his arm herself to prevent
him from falling to the floor.177 She did not receive any type of assistance from the health personnel who “were just putting on their
gloves.”178 Due to this lack of healthcare during labor, she had to receive
emergency care for a laceration and hemorrhage. 179 After this interven171. CONSTITUCIÓN DE LE REPÚBLICA DEL ECUADOR [CONSTITUTION] Art. 86(3) (2008).
172. Ley Orgánica de Garantías Jurisdiccionales y Control Constitucional, Registro Oficial
52, 21 septiembre 2009, art. 8 (Ecuador).
173. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of Ecuador], 13/12/2019,
Sentencia No. 904-12-JP/19 (Ecuador).
174. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of Ecuador], Sentencia No.
904-12-JP/19 at ¶¶ 10-11.
175. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of Ecuador], Sentencia No.
904-12-JP/19 at ¶ 12.
176. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of Ecuador], Sentencia No.
904-12-JP/19 at ¶¶ 12-13.
177. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of Ecuador], Sentencia No.
904-12-JP/19 at ¶ 13.
178. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of Ecuador], Sentencia No.
904-12-JP/19 at ¶ 13 (citing Corte Constitucional del Ecuador, testimonio de Jessica
del Rosario Nole Ochoa en audiencia, 1 de octubre de 2019, registro de audio).
179. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of Ecuador], Sentencia No.
904-12-JP/19 at ¶¶ 13-14.
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tion, she was transferred to a public hospital because healthcare personnel believed she was not up to date with the payments of social security. 180 During this transfer, Jessika del Rosario declared that she was
treated like “an animal” and that this experience was painful, traumatic
and her life was in danger.181 She felt as if she was almost dying.182
2. Decision
Jessika sued the Ecuadorian Institute of Social Security requesting a
declaration of the violation of the following constitutional rights: right
to health, social security, rights of pregnant women, freedom, responsibilities of the State and right to emergency care, arguing that “we cannot
permit that these situations happen again.”183 The Ecuadorian Constitutional Court responded by clearly stating the issue at stake: every woman has a right to reproductive health, which is directly related to their
rights to health, life, and personal integrity. 184 The court reminded the
States of its constitutional obligation to ensure actions and services of
sexual health and reproductive health, and guarantee the integral health
and life of women—especially during their pregnancy, childbirth and
postpartum.185 Violations of this obligation have “grave consequences
for the rights of women, especially during the pregnancy, childbirth and
postpartum”.186 The court gives a textured account of how women in
Ecuador experience obstetric violence: hundreds of them do not receive
adequate care in the health system, and this is linked to maternal and
fetal mortality. 187 The court stated that pregnant women are part of a

180. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador
904-12-JP/19 at ¶ 15.
181. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador
904-12-JP/19 at ¶¶ 16-17.
182. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador
904-12-JP/19 at ¶ 16.
183. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador
904-12-JP/19 at ¶ 22.
184. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador
904-12-JP/19 at ¶ 30.
185. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador
904-12-JP/19 at ¶ 30.
186. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador
904-12-JP/19 at ¶ 30.
187. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador
904-12-JP/19 at ¶ 31.

[Constitutional Court of Ecuador], Sentencia No.
[Constitutional Court of Ecuador], Sentencia No.
[Constitutional Court of Ecuador], Sentencia No.
[Constitutional Court of Ecuador], Sentencia No.
[Constitutional Court of Ecuador], Sentencia No.
[Constitutional Court of Ecuador], Sentencia No.
[Constitutional Court of Ecuador], Sentencia No.
[Constitutional Court of Ecuador], Sentencia No.
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group that need priority attention, and for this reason it is paramount to
identify the rights violated and to establish the state’s responsibility. 188
Since the concept of obstetric violence had not previously been
recognized in Ecuadorian jurisprudence, the Court also developed a list
of the elements, actions, and omissions that amount to such violence.
These include the abusive use of medicines, the appropriation or lack of
care of women’s body and their reproductive processes, being treated in
an inhumane or degrading manner, and disregarding women’s autonomy and capacity to decide freely about their body.189 This violence causes many women to distrust and stop using the public health system.190
The Court concluded that Jessika del Rosario was a victim of obstetric
violence, and that her rights to priority healthcare services, health, and
social security were violated. 191
3. Reparations
The court provided reparations including publication of an apology, publication of this ruling on the website of the Health Ministry and
the Institute of Social Security, and guarantees of non-repetition.192 The
reparations were established upon the petition of Jessika del Rosario
who declared that “we cannot permit that these situations happen
again.”193 The guarantees of non-repetition included the development
of a healthcare assistance guide for caring for pregnant women and preventing obstetric violence.194 Additionally, the Court ordered the Institute of Social Security to develop a technical plan to verify whether the
healthcare centers—public and private—had the conditions necessary to
care for pregnant women and address obstetric emergencies. 195
188. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of
904-12-JP/19 at ¶ 34.
189. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of
904-12-JP/19 at ¶ 67.
190. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of
904-12-JP/19 at ¶ 34.
191. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of
904-12-JP/19 at Section V. Decision ¶ 2.
192. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of
904-12-JP/19 at Section V. Decision ¶ 3 (d)-(g).
193. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of
904-12-JP/19 at ¶ 81.
194. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of
904-12-JP/19 at Section V. Decision ¶ 3 (e).
195. Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of
904-12-JP/19 at Section V. Decision ¶ 3 (f).

Ecuador], Sentencia No.
Ecuador], Sentencia No.
Ecuador], Sentencia No.
Ecuador], Sentencia No.
Ecuador], Sentencia No.
Ecuador], Sentencia No.
Ecuador], Sentencia No.
Ecuador], Sentencia No.
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4. Significance of the Case
This is the first case that the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court addressed obstetric violence as a form of violence against women. 196 The
Ecuadorian Constitutional Court relied on international human rights
norms to build the content of the definition of obstetric violence under
national legislation. 197 This decision sets a precedent in the region, specifically in a moment where obstetric violence is gaining visibility given
the push from the feminist movement to include obstetric violence as a
concept in national legislation.198
By requesting transformative reparations in this case, Jessika del
Rosario moves from being a victim-survivor of obstetric violence to an
agent of change in her society. The usefulness of these reparations to
address the issue of obstetric violence goes beyond transforming only
Jessika del Rosario’s life, but aims at impacting a wider population of
pregnant women. For example, the obligation to develop a guide on
comprehensive care of pregnant women and prevention of obstetric violence will serve to avoid the mistreatment of pregnant women in future
cases. Unfortunately, the Court failed to frame obstetric violence as a
form of gender-based discrimination, nor included an intersectional perspective of these practices, which disproportionately affect poor, indigenous women living in rural areas. 199 Establishing this form of violence as
gender-based discrimination is essential to understand the proper violations, which in turn enables assessing the harm from a gender perspective. In S.M.F v. Spain, the CEDAW Committee held that obstetric violence is a form of gender-based discrimination that takes place precisely
due to the presence of structural discrimination and gender stereotypes.200 Similarly, the intersectional approach would enable to craft
196. Special Rapporteur Report, supra note 37, at ¶ 5.
197. See Corte Constitucional del Ecuador [Constitutional Court of Ecuador], 13/12
/2019, Sentencia No. 904-12-JP/19 (Ecuador).
198. See, e.g., Gabriela Lemos de Pinho Zanardo, Magaly Calderón Uribe, Ana Hertzog
Ramos De Nadal & Luísa Fernanda Habigzan, Violência Obstétrica no Brasil: Uma
Revisão Narrativa, 29 PSICOLOGIA & SOCIEDADE (2019) (arguing that Brazil needs a
conceptualization of obstetric violence, defining and criminalizing it).
199. E.g., Alyne da Silva Pimentel Teixeira v. Brazil, CEDAW/C/49/D/17/2008, Views of
the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women under article
7, paragraph 3, of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women, ¶ ¶ 7.4 & 7.6 (Aug. 10, 2011), https://
www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/CEDAW-C-49-D-17-2008.pdf.
200. S.M.F. v. Spain, CEDAW/C/75/D/138/2018, Decision adopted by the Committee under
article 4(2)(c) of the Optional Protocol, ¶ 7.3 (Feb. 28, 2020), https://digitallibrary.un.org
/record/3870902?ln=en.
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reparations that also target how gender discrimination interacts with
other forms of discrimination, as obstetric violence disproportionally affects indigenous women from low socio-economic backgrounds and
from rural areas. Thus, the health care assistance guide should target
these forms of intersecting discrimination. In essence, both these approaches would have permitted the establishment of more nuanced reparations aimed at addressing discrimination and gender stereotypes as
root causes of obstetric violence.
C. Colombia
Colombia has a relatively complex institutional framework regarding reparations.201 Following the Peace Accord in 2016 that put an end
to an internal armed conflict of more than 50 years, 202 the government
created the Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparations and
Non-Repetition.203 This system aims at guaranteeing an institutional
transition from the armed conflict that satisfies the rights of the victims
from the conflict and contributes to the national reconciliation. 204 The
System is composed of a series of mechanisms to guide the transitional
justice process, including, among others, a Commission for the Clarification of Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Repetition and the Special Jurisdiction of Peace. 205 The former seeks to find the truth of what happened during the Colombian internal armed conflict and to clarify the
violations that took place during the conflict; it can only provide nonbinding recommendations.206 The latter investigates, judges, and pun201. Colombia has a plurality of mechanisms to access reparations. It has the reparations that
can be accessed through the ordinary judicial system, such as private and public laws
regulating damages and torts. Reparations are also regulated through the instruments
that have been created to address the violations committed during the internal armed
conflict. See Nelson Camilo Sánchez León & Clara Sandoval-Villalba, Go Big or Go
Home? Lessons Learned from the Colombian Victims’ Reparation System, in REPARATIONS
FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES, AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 547, 549
(Carla Festman & Marianna Goetz, eds., 2020).
202. ACUERDO FINAL PARA LA TERMINACIÓN DEL CONFLICTO Y LA CONSTRUCCIÓN DE
UNA PAZ ESTABLE Y DURADERA [FINAL AGREEMENT TO END THE ARMED CONFLICT
AND BUILD A STABLE AND LASTING PEACE] (Nov. 24, 2016) (Colom.).
203. Id. at § 5.
204. Jurisdicción Especial Para la Paz, JURISDICCIÓN ESPECIAL PARA LA PAZ, https://
www.jep.gov.co/JEP/Paginas/Jurisdiccion-Especial-para-la-Paz.aspx [https://perma.cc
/DD7E-KRBW] (last visited August 26, 2021, 9:12 PM).
205. Id.
206. ¿Qué es la Comisión de la Verdad?, COMISIÓN DE LA VERDAD, https://comision
delaverdad.co/la-comision/que-es-la-comision-de-la-verdad [https://perma.cc/N3N32LC3] (last visited November 12, 2021, 7:05 PM).
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ishes human rights violations, war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed during the armed conflict.207 It determines the criminal responsibility of perpetrators but does not have the competence to provide
reparations. 208
The responsibility to provide reparations to the victims of the
armed conflict is left to the Victims’ and Land Restitution Act.209 This
Act has been hailed for comprising one of the most “complex and integral reparations” programs, combining individual and collective reparations, including land restitution.210 It determines that victims have a
right to access a variety of reparations that must take into account the
facts, type of harm, and vulnerability of victims. 211 It also uses an “imprint of transformative reparations” such as supporting rights related to
“education, health, housing, employment, and income generation [programs].”212
Apart from the mechanisms established in the System of Truth,
Justice, Reparations and Non-Repetition, Colombian courts, notably
the Constitutional Court, are also shaping and advancing reparations.213
The Constitutional Court has embedded the right to integral reparations in domestic law, recognized the jurisprudence of the IACtHR, and
encouraged the participation of victims in the design, planning, and
monitoring of reparation policies. 214 For example, the Constitutional
Court determined that reparations for internally displaced persons—the
vast majority of victims—should also come in the form of compensation.215 Likewise, the Court recognized that sexual violence is a habitual,
extended, systematic, and invisible practice in the armed conflict, and
207. ¿Qué es la JEP? Misión, Visión y Objetivos , JURISDICCIÓN ESPECIAL PARA LA PAZ,
https://www.jep.gov.co/JEP/Paginas/Mision-vision-objetivos.aspx [https://perma.cc
/P3XL-4K9J] (last visited November 12, 2021, 7:08 PM).
208. Id.
209. L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 2 (Colom.).
210. Weber, supra note 72, at 89.
211. L. 1448/11, junio 10, 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.] art. 25 (Colom.).
212. Sánchez León & Sandoval-Villalba, supra note 201 at 553.
213. Since 1991, Colombia has a specific court, the Constitutional Court, that decides all
constitutional law issues. The other courts in the nation do not have competence of
reviewing constitutional law. The highest court in the ordinary jurisdiction is the Supreme Court of Justice. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA [C.P.]
[CONSTITUTION] art. 234. The Colombian Court is responsible for keeping the integrity and supremacy of the Constitution. This includes deciding whether legislation, governmental acts, treaties, and other acts are in accordance with the Constitution; and reviewing certain court decision on violations of constitutional rights.
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLOMBIA, supra, art. 241.
214. Sánchez León & Sandoval-Villalba, supra note 201, at 567.
215. Id.
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that displaced women are at a particular risk of experiencing it.216 The
Court ordered the implementation of thirteen public policy programs to
specifically address the differential risks displaced women faced. 217 It
also used transformative forms of monitoring to confront the “culture of
state non-compliance” with the judicial decisions, 218 by assigning a
Working Group to monitor compliance with the decisions and its Confidential Annexes. 219
In this section, I review how the Constitutional Court has advanced reparations on reproductive justice by analyzing the case SU599
/19.220 This is the first case worldwide to address reproductive violations
of former combatant women and girls during the internal armed conflict.221

216. Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], Auto 092/08, section III.1.1.1.
(Colom.), https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/autos/2008/a092-08.htm
[https://perma.cc/7BSF-5DUA]; see also Corte Constitutional [C.C.] [Constitutional
Court], Auto 009/15 (Colom.), https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/autos
/2015/A009-15.htm [https://perma.cc/PP53-LTM5]. For an explanation of these autos
in English, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, COLOMBIA: HIDDEN FROM JUSTICE.
IMPUNITY FOR CONFLICT-RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE, A FOLLOW-UP REPORT (2012),
https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/colombia_vaw_report_oct._4_embargoed.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7KEC-T6LJ].
217. Erika Rodríguez Gómez, The Peace Process Did Not Mean the End of Violence for
Women in Colombia, LONDON SCH. OF ECON. CTR. FOR WOMEN, PEACE AND SEC.
BLOG (Oct. 12, 2017), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2017/10/12/the-peace-processdid-not-mean-the-end-of-violence-for-women-in-colombia/ [https://perma.cc/BQF8VUVD].
218. Sánchez León & Sandoval-Villalba, supra note 201 at 567.
219. Liliana Rocío Chaparro Moreno, ACCESO A LA JUSTICIA PARA MUJERES VÍCTIMAS DE
VIOLENCIA SEXUAL SEXTO INFORME DE SEGUIMIENTO AL AUTO 092 DE 2008 Y
PRIMER INFORME DE SEGUIMIENTO AL AUTO 009 DE 2015, ANEXOS RESERVADOS
MESA DE SEGUIMIENTO A LOS AUTOS 092 Y 009 DE LA CORTE CONSTITUCIONAL,
ANEXOS RESERVADOS, 46-47, 80 (2016), https://www.dejusticia.org/wp-content
/uploads/2017/02/fi_name_recurso_822.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6NE-F654].
220. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], SU-599/19 (Colom.), https://
www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/Relatoria/2019/SU599-19.htm [https://perma.cc/8UZC6W6E].
221. Christine Chinkin & Keina Yoshida, Colombia’s Recent Ruling on Reproductive Violence and Forced Recruitment is a Significant Step for Ex-combatant Women and Girls,
LONDON SCH. OF ECON. LATIN AMERICAN AND CARRIBBEAN CTR. BLOG (Feb. 19,
2020), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/latamcaribbean/2020/02/19/colombias-recent-rulingon-reproductive-violence-and-forced-recruitment-is-a-significant-step-for-excombatant-women-and-girls/ [https://perma.cc/GS6F-N2UA].
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1. Facts
Helena was recruited by members of the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Columbia (FARC) at the age of 14. They informed her that it
was forbidden to have children and that all women were obliged to use
contraceptives. 222 Helena felt obliged to be injected with Mesigyna—a
hormonal contraceptive. 223 In 2007, she found out that she was six
months pregnant and was forced to have an abortion at seven months.
She did not want the abortion, but members of FARC threatened her
with death. Without her consent, she was supplied drugs and a doctor
performed an abortion through a Cesarean section.224 She was allowed
to go to her family’s home to recuperate. 225 A month after the surgery,
she started experiencing pain and health problems as a result of the surgery. 226 Members of the FARC went to her family’s home demanded
her to return to the FARC, therefore she fled to another city. 227 She
sought health assistance and, even though she indicated she was a victim
of a forced abortion, she was not given adequate care in the public
health system. 228 She had to go to a private health center, and, thanks
to the help of the organization Profamilia, she also made an appointment with a psychologist. 229 She was diagnosed with depression, posttraumatic stress disorder, and feeling of frustration and helplessness.230
Moreover, she eventually had the needed surgery. 231
In order to access the reparations and services established in the
Victims’ Act, Helena sought to be recognized as a victim of the armed
conflict, but was rejected.232 The authorities argued that she did not present the petition within the established time frame,233 and, importantly,
that she did not fulfill the requirements to be recognized as a victim under the Victims’ Act. Article 3 of the Victims’ Act defines victims as
those persons who suffered a harm due to the facts that took place after
January 1st, 1985, and as a result of the internal armed conflict, as a consequence of violations of international humanitarian law or of grave vio222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

SU-599/19 at ¶ 1.3 (Colom.).
Id.
Id. at ¶ 1.5.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 1.7.
SU-599/19 at ¶ 1.8.
Id. at ¶ 1.12-1.14.
Id. at ¶ 1.15.
Id.
SU-599/19 at ¶ 1.16
Id. at ¶ 1.19.
Id.
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lations of international human rights law. However, it states that members of armed groups organized on the side of the law will not be considered victims unless they were recruited and left the armed group
while still minors. 234 Although Helena had been recruited as a minor,
she was an adult when she left the armed group. 235
2. Decision
The Colombian Constitutional Court examined whether the exclusion from the inscription in the Single Registry of Victims (RUV) 236 was
a violation of Helena’s fundamental rights. The court pointed out that
the timeframe established in Victims’ Act is flexible and authorities
must consider the specific individual circumstances which may delay
people being designated as victims.237
The court then analyzed the provision excluding former members
of armed groups of the Victims’ Act. In its previous jurisprudence, the
court had established that under certain circumstances, former members
of armed groups can be recognized as victims, but only if they also participated in a social reintegration process.238 However, the court noted
that forcing Helena to go through the process of social reintegration
would revictimize her: it identifies her as a member of the FARC —the
same group that violated her fundamental rights —and would have required her to participate in the program next to the perpetrators.239 The
court held that denying the recognition of victimhood to former members of armed groups that have suffered sexual violence by the armed
groups would be contrary to international law. 240
Moreover, the court noted that forced abortion and contraceptives
constituted a form of sexual violence and a war crime.241 Women who
experienced sexual violence in the context of internal armed conflict
must be recognized victims through the process established in the Vic-

234. Id.
235. SU-599/19 at ¶¶ 1.3, 2.5.
236. The Single Registry of Victims was created in 2012 due to the Law 1448/2011. This
Registry coordinates the measures of assistance and reparations for the victims of
the armed conflict. For more information, see UNIDAD DE VÍCTIMAS, https://
www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/ [https://perma.cc/H53P-3643].
237. SU-599/19 at ¶¶ 2.3, 3.4.
238. Id. at § 2.5.
239. Id. at § 2.8.1.
240. Id. at § 2.11, 3.2.
241. Id.
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tims’ Act and should have access to reparations.242 Excluding them from
this process and making them to seek reparations through the ordinary
justice procedures 243 is a violation of their effective access to justice.244
3. Reparations
The court ordered Helena’s inclusion in the Single Registry of Victims as a victim of minor forced recruitment, sexual violence, and forced
displacement, and instructed the Reparations Unit to ensure a gender
perspective within the reparations process and due diligence obligations
in relation to Helena’s fundamental rights.245 Although the court did
not itself provide transformative reparations, ordering the recognition of
Helena as a victim is per se transformative, as she would have access to
the array of measures of the domestic reparation program and will enable other former FARC members who have been subjected to sexual violence to also access these reparations. The court also awarded reparations
in the form of rehabilitation, including immediate healthcare, psychosocial and psychological care with a gender perspective to appease the
emotional consequences of the sexual violence. 246
4. Significance of This Case
This case confirmed that the use of forced contraceptives and
forced abortions is a violation of women’s sexual and reproductive rights
and constitutes a war crime.247 Since reproductive violations had previously been minimally addressed in transitional justice contexts or international criminal law, 248 the case set an important precedent. This ruling also provides an account of the gendered dynamics within armed
groups, including the control over the reproductive autonomy of young
girls.249 Furthermore, the recognition of these practices within armed
groups “is an essential element for the removal of stigma, for building a
242. Id. at § 3.6.
243. As opposed to the Special Jurisdiction of Peace, which has sole jurisdiction over the
crimes committed during the Colombian armed conflict, ordinary justice procedures
are those that apply to the rest of circumstances.
244. SU-599/19 at ¶ 3.2.
245. Id. at Part III.
246. Id. at Section 2.10.
247. SU-599/19 at ¶ 3.2.
248. Rosemary Grey, The ICC’s First “Forced Pregnancy” Case in Historical Perspective, 15
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 905 (2017).
249. Chinkin & Yoshida, supra note 221.
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comprehensive and gendered understanding of the different ways in
which young girls were forced to support the armed groups and for
moving forward in post-conflict societal reconstruction.”250 At the same
time, the court could have provided further details to the Victims Units
on the design of reparations, such as taking into consideration the conditions of former members of the armed groups, or the inclusion of reproductive violence as a separate category of harm. 251
This case establishes the conditions for expanding the understanding of reproductive justice in the region beyond the transitional justice
context. It recognizes that interventions into a woman’s decision to have
a child are also a form of violation of their reproductive autonomy. The
awareness of these violations will likely increase substantially due to the
recent filed violations in some of the armed groups in the Colombian
conflict.252
VI. CONCLUSION
Reproductive justice is essential to women’s equal citizenship. In
this Article, I have examined how women’s reproductive autonomy and
self-determination can be expanded through reparations. International

250. Id.
251. Angelica Cocomá Ricuarte & Juliana Laguna Trujillo, Reproductive Violence: A Necessary
Category of Analysis in Transitional Justice Scenarios, LONDON SCH. OF ECON. CTR. FOR
WOMEN, PEACE AND SEC. BLOG (Jun. 24, 2020), https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/wps/2020/06
/24/reproductive-violence-a-necessary-category-of-analysis-in-transitional-justice-scenarios/
[https://perma.cc/6E7C-CCYQ].). Although reproductive autonomy and sexual violence are conceptually different categories, the litigator—Women’s Link Worldwide—
chose to frame these violations within the concept of sexual violence. In this case, the
Court’s decision expands the concept of sexual violence to include violations to reproductive autonomy, opening the path for the advancement of reproductive justice
through their litigation as a form of sexual violence, as recognized in national and international law. However, scholars still debate as to whether the category of sexual violence
is adequate to include reproductive violations, or whether it is necessary to create a new
category for reproductive violations. Indeed, these are two separate categories and are
not necessarily linked. Instead of having to stretch to include women’s experiences in
existent categories, Charlotte Buch suggests that legislation should start from women’s
lives and forge categories of rights and protections that better reflect the daily features of
women’s experiences. See Charlotte Bunch, Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a
Re-Vision of Human Rights, 12 HUM. RTS Q. 486 (1990).
252. This report is confidential. However, the executive summary is available. See Women’s
Link Worldwide, REPORT: “A VIOLENCE WITHOUT NAME: REPRODUCTIVE VIOLENCE
IN THE COLOMBIAN ARMED CONFLICT”. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, https://www.womens
linkworldwide.org/en/files/3122/executive-summary-reproductive-violence-in-thecolombian-armed-conflict.pdf [https://perma.cc/KS79-YNAB].
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and regional human rights bodies have been incorporating the parameters of reparations developed in transitional justice contexts. However,
the transformative potential of these reparations can only be achieved if
the root causes that enabled the violence to take place are addressed. For
this reason, it is important for courts to adequately establish the facts,
violations, harms, and determine who is a victim. For reproductive violations, root causes include socio-cultural practices that legitimize this
form of violence and perpetuate stereotypes that limit women’s citizenship to their role as mothers.
The decisions of Latin American courts showcase different forms of
reproductive violence that still have not been significantly addressed in
the international and regional arena and serve to expand the understanding of reproductive justice. These cases set a precedent for how
reparations can be used to address reproductive violations and advance
women’s citizenship. Access to reproductive justice enables women to
have full control over their bodies (essential to anybody’s personhood),
it enables them to have autonomy to determine the life’s course and access all the possibilities promised to citizens, including the economic,
political and social life. 253 Importantly, it addresses the gender discriminatory stereotypes that continue to constrain women’s lives to their role
as mothers and wives. Of course, there are limits to how much can reparations achieve, especially judicial reparations. These include obstacles
on the costs of litigation, the lengthy time-expand of court decisions,
the limited access of many women to courts, as well as to what extent
some of the transformative reparations intrude with the legislative power. 254 Courts might also apply different standards to reparations in each
case and there are some concerns to whether judicial bodies have the
necessary knowledge and training to order integral reparations 255 that
would be necessary to unsettle gender hierarchies. Despite the fact that
some of the aforementioned cases do not fully grasp all the dimensions
that enable reproductive violations, reparations are being used to advance
women’s reproductive autonomy and to recommend non-repetition at
the international, regional, and national level. These are very positive
examples indeed. 
253. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1200
(1992).
254. See, e.g., Rubio-Marín & de Greiff, supra note 62, at 322-23. See generally Manuel
Iturralde, Access to Constitutional Justice in Colombia: Opportunities and Challenges for
Social and Political Change, in CONSTITUTIONALISM OF THE GLOBAL SOUTH 361
(Daniel Donilla Maldonado ed., 2013) (exposing the criticism to the judicial activism
or new constitutionalism of the Colombian Constitutional Court).
255. Sánchez León & Sandoval-Villalba, supra note 201, at 570.

